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Note: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical conunents. References in 
publications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the 
authors to protect the tentative character of these papers. 
Towards the Implementation of Desirable Rules of Monetary 
Coordination and Interventions 
Abstract 
Adopting the decomposition of the world system into subsystems of 
the sum of and the difference of variables, the paper considers the 
characteristics of optimal rules of monetary coordination and 
exchange-rate intervention in a symmetric, two-country Dornbusch model, 
Global monetarism concerns the sum or average system: Discussions of 
misalignment of exchange rate concerns the difference variables. It is 
shown that the results by Poole (QJE 1970) have a strong analogy in this 
framework, No or little intervention is desirable if dominant 
country-specific shocks are in IS curves; interventions to keep exchange 
rates are desirable if dominant country-specific shocks are in LM 
curves. 
This paper was prepared for the Third International Conference of the 
Bank of Japan, ttToward a World of Economic Stability: Optimal Monetary 
Framework and Policyi" Tokyo, on June 3-5, 1987. We are very much 
indebted to Willem Buiter whose suggestions and comments stimulated our 
research throughout our study. We are also thankful to Michael Jones, 
Masahiro Kawai and T. N. Srinivasan for their helpful discussions, 
Towards the Implementation of Desirable Rules of Monetary 




Nowadays people often claim the existence of misalignments of 
exchange rates among major currencies, and they grope for macroeconomic 
coordination and intervention rules. At the iokyo Summit in May 1986, 
the leaders of seven countries agreed to request their finance ministers 
to review their economic objectives and forecasts collectively using 
indicators such as gross national growth rates, inflation rates, 
interest rates, and so forth. 
It is one thing to name important indicators; quite another to 
implement an effective policy rule based on these indicators. In the 
present world, economy where there are various kinds of disturbances -­
supply or demand, monetary or real, domestic or foreign, and temporary 
or permanent -- policy authorities are obliged to rely on some form of 
monetary rules and intervention rules if they wish to turn the 
declaration of the summit into an operational scheme. 
ihe purpose of this paper is to characterize the nature of simple, 
appropriate rules for monetary management in the world economy under 
uncertainty, We will confine our attention to choices among simple 
feedback rules. Even though sophisticated discussions of complex 
dynamic rules, contingent both upon various state variables and upon the 
reaction of the other player, are intellectually fascinating, we 
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consider that the examination of simpler rules is at least as important 
as that of sophisticated ones. Simpler rules have a strong advantage in 
that they can be more easily explained to policy makers and more easily 
understood by them so that the possibility of adopting one of the 
simpler rules is much higher. 
We must distinguish two types of policy discussions in 
international macroeconmics on two issues: The first issue is the need 
for global monetary coordination, addressed in the proposal of McKinnon 
(1984) that the monetary authorities of the major countries should agree 
to provide stable aggregate monetary growth to the world economy in 
order to stabilize the world price level. The second issue is possible 
remedies for exchange misalignment, emphasized by Williamson (1983). 
The discussion of misalignment is concerned with the relative prices of 
currencies, and 1 accordingly, with differences among national economies. 
We will primarily rely on a stochastic two-country version of the 
model with sluggish price movements developed by Dornbusch (1976) and 
also of the neoclassical flex-prices model where output varies due to 
the discrepancy between the actual and the expected price level (e.g. 
Weber 1981). We shall adopt the method of Aoki (1981) for decomposing 
variables into their sums and differences in a two country model 
1following Miller (1982) and Buiter (1986). In order to keep our 
analysis transparent and focus on the qualitative nature of desirable 
rules, we will deal with a two country situation with a symmetric 
economic structure, assuming identical parameters of characterizing 
economic behavior between the two countries. Only stochastic 
disturbances and accordingly policy reactions to these disturbances can 
differ. 
Under these assumptions, we will show that the subsystems of the 
Dornbusch model with sluggish prices as well as those of a neoclassical 
model have structures similar to the closed Keynesian model under 
disturbances that was analyzed by Poole (1970). In the system of 
average variables of our two-country model 1 Poole's original results 
naturally hold. The world average or global money supply target is more 
desirable when synchronized disturbances in the IS curve dominate; the 
target for the average interest rate target is more desirable when 
synchronized disturbances in money demand such as a worldwide financial 
innovation dominate. More interesting is the fact that analogy holds in 
the difference system as well. No or little intervention is more 
desirable when country specific disturbances are mainly in the IS curve, 
including disturbances due to changing competitiveness in trade; 
extensive intervention in such a way as to slow down the movement of 
exchange rates or to reduce the difference in interest rates is more 
desirable when the difference, or country-specific; disturbances in the 
LM curve dominate, 
There have been many contributions on optimal intervention rules 
under uncertainty,notably Boyer (1978), Turnovsky (1983) 1 Weber (1981) 1 
and many articles in Bhandari (1985), By adopting a symmetric structure 
between countries; our paper focuses on the interaction of overall 
disturbances and country-specific disturbances. Thus the results by 
Weber 11981) are generalized and set in a more symmetric framework. We 
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also show the effectiveness of feedback rules on interest rate 
differentials. Such rules have been relatively neglected compared with 
those that feedback from exchange rates. The link between this kind of 
model and Poole's analysis was already suggested by Buiter and Eaton 
(1985), but our analysis shows that the link is much stronger than one 
might imagine. Some regularities found in the simulation analysis by 
McKibbin and Sachs (1986) can be better understood by our complementary, 
analytical approach. 
In Section II, we will develop the basic framework of the 
two-country Dornbusch model, in Section II we will characterize the 
optimization problem in the decomposed subsystems of the sum and the 
difference. In Section IV, we will compare the results of the Dornbusch 
model with a neoclassical model where prices clear the goods market 
instantaneously while the supply of output depends on unexpected price 
changes. Section V summarizes the results and the Appendix sketches the 
possible extension of our approach ton-country case, 
II. The Basic Framework 
In order to illustrate the advantage of decomposing the system into 
averages and differences, consider a simple two-country version of the 
Dornbusch model. Every parameter is symmetric between the two 
countries, but disturbances and policy variables may differ. Herem, p, 
y 1 ands refer respectively to the logarithm of nominal money supply 1 
price level, real income, and nominal spot exchange rate ithe price of 
the foreign currency in terms of the home currency). i is the nominal 
rate of interest. All the variables with asterisks indicate the 
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variables for the foreign country. Subscripts refer to time periods, 
There are three types of random disturbances to the system: an LM shock 
Et I} an IS shock 17t and a price shock {-lt ii Throughout the paper l~e shall 
* * passume that f:· and (similarly .-* and f.(t) are mutually and-t ! ·It f.\ ct, 17t 
time independent, On the other handi we do allow positive or negative 
* correlation bett~een F and <:::·-t; * l7t and 17t ! or 1Ht and f.\•* Let us denote-t .,2 2 2 F. "-,El't=-'t.l = ac:; E<rt>
') 
= a and - \f•\ I = a 
2 
,, I and so forth, ,_ t f( I'' 
The model can be described as follows: 
(la l m -p =-~1· +y +F'"t t "'·t·t-'t 
*(2a.l y =-Bii -E p +p )-·Yip -c. -p ) +nt · t t t+l t t -t t ·t 
(3b) p * -p,=b(y,-v * . * -it )+M * t+l t t · · t 
Here Etpt+l, for example, indicates the price in period t+l forecasted 
in period t. 
Equations (la) 1 ilb) and (2a) 1 (2b) are respectively the standard 
LM, IS curves with the simplifying assumption of the unitary income 
elasticity of the demand for money. (3a) and (3b) indicate that price 
levels adjust only slowly, that is, & is small, , • , the crucial 
6 
assumption in the Dornbusch overshooting model, We do not dare to 
defend this formulation ourselves, but we will rather contrast the 
characteristics of the optimal feedback rules in this sluggish price 
model with those in a neoclassical flex-price model in Section IV. 
Equation (4i indicates the uncovered interest parity through perfect 
capital mobility. 
Under the normalization that y = O, the price equation becomes 
-c:{Sa'.i pt+l - pt = f.i f_,.:i 1'l+•"l·)p +,-rt-i F p -,·r·1~,. +iJ,(m ;' +•"IY• \ + 1_1t- o:+ P 1t· ~-- t ~-/·- - t t + 1 ~- t ,... t ~ t ~- 1t J r 
and 
where zt - pt-st-pt * denotes the real exchange rate. Notice that there 
is no counterpart with an asterisk to zt but it enters with different 
signs in (5b), There is an element of arbitrariness in what one assumes 
about the information set on the basis of which private agents make 
decisions (see t~eber (1981) Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff (1983)). 
For simplicity, we assume that private agents at time t possess full 
information on all current variables yt' pt' it; st and on the value of 
expected exchange rate Etst+l that is embodied in the forward exchange 
rate. This means that private agents can infer exactly the values of E,
'C 
and ryt, However, they cannot observe pt+l at time t and accordingly not 
the value of,~\· Therefore, 
7 
* * 
= Etpt+l + 11t. 
III. Optimal Feedback Rules in Decomposed Systems 
Utilizing the method of Aoki (1981), we denote the additive 
variables with the superscript a and the difference variables with the 
,., 
superscript d.L That is, for any variable (or disturbance) X, define 
xa = X + x* t t t 
Xd * -= xt xtt 
Then the real exchange rate can be written zt 
1n_eres. t t ·+ .oecomes Etst+l-st = 1t,par1_y .d 
As the objective of the system, we will take the minimization of 
the unconditional output variances in the two countries. By the 
following argument, we will show that the objectives of minimizing 
unconditional output variances can be reduced in this symmetrical world, 
to the minimization of both the unconditional variance of average output 
and the unconditional variance of difference in output. 
Consider the following two country linear systems of variables (or 
* *vectors) X and X that depend on (vectors of) disturbances E and E as 
well as policy parameters rr and rr. * 
( 7) X = F <E, 
8 
* * * * (8) X = F ( E, i:: ; rr, rr ) 
Suppose they are decomposed into two separate systems such that 
* d .. * a dwhere as usual Xa = X + X , X = X - Ji ; and where rr and rr can be 
independently chosen, Then we can state: 
Proposition l. If the variances of Xa and Xd are minimized with respect 
a d * to Tl' and rr, then the sum of the variances, Var(Xl + Var{X l, will be 
minimized, In particular, if the two countries are completely symmetric 
..... a ""d , * -'··a cl .,._a .,.,d
such that Var(x, rr, rr) = Var ,x 1 rr, rr l, where rr and rr are 
respectively the maximizer of Var ixa) and Var ixd) then the 
minimization with respect torra and rr d will achieve both the 
* *minimization of Var{x, rr) and Var (x , rr ) .. 
Proof Since 
* *Var{Xal = VariX) + Var(X ) + 2Cov(X, X ) ' 
Var{Xd, = Var(X) + Var{X*> - 2Cov<X, x*1. ; 
it follows 
* dVar{X) + Var(X ) = {Var(Xal + Var(X )}/2, 
..... a~ 
By assumption V ar ( ,,a " ; rra) ;:: Var(Xa; rr J 
0 ·'··d.V ( .,d dlar,. ; rr . ~ Var(X ; 1T I 
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'"' V ( X * · . . . d h a d d h ·Th ere f ore Var1A1 + ar I are m1n1m1ze wen rr an rr are c osen 1n 
such a way as to minimize Xa and Xd respectively. Thus the minimization 
of VarlXa> and VarlXd) amounts to minimizing the sum of variances of X 
and By assumption rra and rrd can be chosen independently. The 
second half of the proposition automatically follows from the hypothesis 
that Var(X; 
Thus, we can consider separately the minimization of the variance 
of the sum of outputs in the additive system and the variance of the 
difference of outputs below. 
A. The Analysis of the Additive System 
Under assumption (6a) and (6b) i equations 15a) and 15b) lead to the 
following difference equation: 
o:f..; a a 
+ r.J l7t + f.lto:+,8-o:pb 
Thus the additive system is completely separated from all endogenous and 
exogenous difference variables such as nominal and real exchange rates. 
Equation (11) indicates that the average price level of the world 
depends on the aggregate money supply, and is independent of the 
exchange rate in this symmetric setting. This may be viewed as giving a 
supporting ground to McKinnon's proposal that the countries of the world 
should agree to provide a stable growth rate for the global money stock 
3IMcKinnon,1984). In this symmetric system neither the variation of 
aggregate output nor the optimal monetary feedback rule depends on the 
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exchange rate. That is, the average unemployment rate in the world does 
not depend on exchange rates or the rule of intervention. 
Based on our previous discussions of the decomposition of 
objectives, we take the target of minimizing the unconditional variance 
of average output fluctuations for the objective function for the 
average system: 
Var (y;) = Var (Etp:+1 - p:) / el , 
That is, we are interested in minimizing 
<12 l 
If monetary authorities were able to observe all the current 
a a
variables, and thus to infer exactly st and ryt' and if they were able to 
react without lags, then they could reduce the expression in (12) to 
a zero eHept for the influence of!-\· For example, from equation (lll 
the Va is minimized if they set 
However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the monetary authorities 
can not only observe but also react to all the current variables and 
disturbances inferred from them. For example, price index data usually 
come with some lags while interest rates are known more readily. 
Moreover, the spirit of our approach is to find out some simple feedback 
rule that can be implemented by monetary authorities, without extensive 
11 
information requirements. Thus we follow Poole 119701 and consider the 
case where the monetary authorities observe and jointly react to the sum 
of the interest rates or, equivalently, to the world average interest 
rate. In particular, we focus on the following feedback rule: 
The aggregate money supply is assumed to be controlled jointly through a 
McKinnon type scheme. 
Then, one obtains: 
where '/'Irr) = o:+/3 - /3{1+0:)6+11-/:'.&)rr, f (rrl = 10:+{Jl-o:f!b+(l-{!,fir.r, 
In this sluggish price model, 114) has a nonexplosive (backward I 
solution if and only if 
i 15 I 'f'lrrl / f (rrl 
If the price movement in the goods market is sluggish!£; takes a small 
value. Accordingly, let us assume that 
r •:I+ /3 1 lI16 I ti< min. lfll 1 +20:1 ' "fi·.1' 
Then one can easily check that !kl< l and accordingly that the system is 
12 
stable in the absence of a feedback rule (rr = Ol. Also, the stability 
condition is satisfied if and only if flrr) > 0. 
It is rather difficult to consider optimal policies encountering 
various kinds of shocks at the same time. Therefore we will consider 
one by one the optimal feedback rules that will be appropriate for each 
type of shock individually. Define: 
then 
By using a lag operator L, (171 will read 
so that given the stability condition flrr) > 0 and given the mutually 
independent white-noise property of<\, 17t; and 1\\; 
( l 9 l 
"j 
1-¢, Irr) 
= • +, vi 117) J Q' + [¢-(1'1')]2 (}' + Q'.r.. ( 
! 9')1 Irrl 2 t.::a l'7il 2 ;.ta, 
2 { [ , , . , 2 2 .r.. ! .-, 1 
.) 
13 
2 · f d ' f '·' . 1 1 wher e a _ 1 s de . as E [ __ a ' 
2 J an d so on: " n • we ~11 con s 1. der1 n e I i.:-:t I
*:.:a 
consecutively the following cases: 
'") 2 2{i) (LM disturbances} a:. > O, a = a = 0
i::.a 17a f.ia 
To minimize Va implies 
Under the assumption (16), the optimal feedback rule that retains the 
stability should be rr ➔ + ~ Thus the optimal monetary policy is to fix 
the world nominal interest rates. 
iii) (IS disturbances) r..r 2 - = a 2 = 0
(::.a f.ta 
Ml·n Va· 1·1 mp 1 es 
{di (rr) } 2 ,.. 2 2
'3 · o (o:+rr)
Min ---- = Min1+ ¢ (rr) [ ( o:+ t3-af.-6) + ( 1 -;C.fJ) rrH i 2-Jl-20:f.3) + ( 1 -pt;) ,r)
TT 1 rr 
Therefore rr = -a will give the solution. We also obtain fl-a) > 0 if 
6 < 1, so that the stability condition is satisfied. Thus this feedback 
rule is effective if the price movement is sufficiently slow in this 
Dornbusch model. If the interest elasticity of money demand a is small, 
then the global monetarism that proposes the constant world money supply 
will be a proper prescription. 
2 2 2(iii} (Price disturbances) a > 0, a,~.a = a = 0 fia <:. na 
Min Va implies 
1-¢ (n-J
l /36
Min l+¢ (rr) = Min '") .) /3 • ? , :it:ff 1 n· ~ ( o:+ /3 - · ( 1 +~ o:, t.,+ (1- f.. ·,) 17 
Since lim firr) > o, the optimal rule is rr ➔ + c,~ as in the case of (i). 
What happens if all kinds of the disturbances coexist? Figure l 
roughly illustrates how the three components of output variances due to 
14 
LM, IS and price equation disturbances vary with respect to the value of 
rr. The relative heights of these curves, of coursei depends on relative 
magnitudes of various disturbances. LM and price disturbances will be 
eliminated if rr approaches plus infinity. The effect of IS disturbances 
increases and approaches 6a2 /(l-,!36) 2 if rr approaches infinity= Whether17a · 
the system should adopt a rule close to that of fixing the average 
interest rate (rr~r.,:)} or that of the global monetarist proposal depends 
on the relative magnitude of three kinds of shocks. 
Thus the additive system behaves almost exactly as the single 
country Keynesian system analyzed by Poole (1970). If aggregate 
disturbances in the LM equation dominate, then it will be desirable to 
try to stabilize the average world interest rate. On the other hand, if 
aggregate disturbances in the IS equation dominate, monetary policy 
should make the average world interest rate fluctuate slightly. In 
particular; if the interest elasticity of money demand is negligible, it 
will be desirable to stabilize the aggregate world money supply. The 
McKinnon (1979) proposal naturally makes more sense if money demand in 
each country is relatively more stable and interest rate inelastic. 
B. The Analysis of the Difference System 
*Recalling the definition of difference variables x: = Xt - xt' we 
obtain the following pair of dynamic equations in terms of ptd ands, 
1: 
from (5a)-(5b) and (4) by recalling zt 
15 
( 20) 
At first we will consider the feedback rule m: = - Tst, An increase in 
mtd is a relative increase of money supply in the home country. Our 
feedback rule can be implemented easily by an unsterilized intervention 
in the foreign exchange market in such a way as to stabilize the spot 
exchange rate. Unsterilized interventions in the form of purchase of 
foreign currencies, for example, increase the home money supply and 
reduce the foreign money supply. The change in m d is twice as large as 
the amount of foreign currency purchased by the home country. Needless 
d . .t o say m increases when Lhe home country expands its money supply by 
domestic credit creation without any action on the part of the foreign 
country. 
Under this feedback rule (20) and (21) become 
[P:+l lp: E: 
(22) = A d + /.1
Etst+l st l.i 
where 
(l -1 ·o:+{3- i 0:/3+ fJ+ 2o:'/ )8A = l.o:+{3- i l +o:) f3B 




A = 1-; 1 ,,.~::/JS I· 
Let us denote the characteristic roots of A as )-,
1 and t, such that2 
The characterization of a system like 124) was given by 
Blanchard-Kahn 11980). The system has Ii) a unique saddle path solution 
if 
IAl I < 1 < p-,2 I (i i ) n o so 1u t i on t hat s a t i sf i ed non - ex pl o s i on con dit i on 
if I< l\
1 I< l:\2 j, and (iii) an infinite number of convergent solutions if 
!t,1 I :;; j:.\2 j < 1, Moreover; if jA1 I < l < jl',2 1, the unique convergent 
solution of (22) can be written in the following form where,\ is the, -1 
characteristic root of A with the smaller norm. 
Either by appealing to the expressions near the end of Blanchard-Kahn 
11980), or by the method of undetermined coefficients, one obtains the 
following expression for •i, •2 and • 3 , 
i25) 
17 
where H = -[l-61P+2Yl] 
J = -[a+p+2v-61µ+2Yl Cl+alJ. 
If the price is sufficiently sluggish i.e. if 6 is small, Hand J are 
likely to be negative. We assume that Hand J are negative. 
Define the characteristic polynomial of A as: 
? ? 
(26) g L\l = ">,.""- (Trace Al A"" + IA I• 
Then; the necessary and sufficient conditions for saddle point 
stability are either ial gil) < 0 and g(-1) > o, or (bl g(l) > 0 and 
g(-1) < 0. (See for e:{ample Sargent 11979)), 
If T = o, gill < 0 and g(-1) > 0 for a small value of 6. Thus for a 
sufficiently small value of 6, the system has the saddle point property 
in the absence of any feedback. Now we shall turn to the minimization 
of the objective function through policy reactions to various kinds of 
shock, considering the optimization of the following objective in terms 
of differences: 
M. . . Vd V (E d d.1n1m1ze = ar tPt+l-ptj' 
which can be written by calculations similar to (19) as 
1 
Vrl
. 2 1' ,• 
' • • 
·t11.r 2 [ . ( ' l?- £.r '1 - l',,1 \ '[} 2· =------ 1 1911--rJ a.-,+ Y'~·r1 a 1+----a.l +/'.l ('I) i. L 1 1 '-::. □ L J 17d ; 1+;\ (7.·) fl □ 
2where n· = ...rc1-d1f·· 2 J• an d so f or_th •-Ed - -
Again consider the following cases of individual differential 
shocks. 
2 2 2I 1 l IL M d i st ur b an c es i C\:.d > 0 tr =a.=0 - r;d f.(rl 
18 
Minimization of Vd implies 
T ➔ ± oo are the solutions. It is also possible to show that 
1 i m g ( l ) = ± c,, and lim g(-1) = ± c,,. 
7: ➔ ± e::; 'l' -1· ± w 
provided that 6 is sufficiently small so that His negative. Thus if 
price levels are sluggish enough, this feedback rule keeps the saddle 
point property intact. However, T makes economic sense only if it 
approaches positive infinity. Moreover, during the process in which the 
monetary authority decreases the value of T from zero to -001 explosive 
solutions are easily produced as is illustrated in Figure 2. The best 
way to cope with differential LM disturbances is to fix exchange rates. 
(ii) (IS disturbances) a 2 
r;id 
Minimization of Vd implies 
Min 
T 
Thus the best policy is again T = -a. 
When T = -a:, g(l) < 0 if a< 1 and g(-1) > (I for a small value of f;, 
Accordingly, this policy keeps the saddle point property intact. 
Thus the best way to cope with differential IS disturbance is to 
intervene slightly in such a way as to lean with the wind. In 
particular, if the interest elasticity of the demand for money is 
negligible (o:=0), then the best regime will be the flexible exchange 
rate system without any intervention, i.e. the clean float. 
2(iii) (Price disturbances) CF~td > (I 
19 
M. Vd . 1.1n. imp 1es 
Apparently the value of T that generates Al = 1 would be the solution. 
However, this definitely violates the stability condition of price 
dynamics because x is A's characteristic root with the smaller norm.
1 
Thus there is no well defined optimal solution. 
Figure 2 roughly illustrates how the two components of output 
variances due to LM and IS disturbances vary, in a typical case, with 
4respect to the value of rr. Again the relative heights between h1 and 
h~ depends on the relative magnitudes of differential disturbances in LM 
k 
and IS curve. (The effect of price equation disturbances is omitted 
because the optimal policy is undefined.) Thus to cope with 
differential shocks to money demand or money supply functions, the best 
regime is the fixed exchange rate regime, To cope with differential 
shocks in IS curves 1 interventions leaning slightly with the wind are 
desirable. In particular if the interest elasticity of money demand is 
negligible, clean floating is optimal. 
Similarly one could work with interventions responding to the 
forward exchange market, namely 
(2 ~1l. mdt = 'E
T tst+l 
which would give the following A in equation (22): 
o:+ [3- o:f!h o:+ /3- (0:/3+ /3+ 2o:Y ) ti 
A = 
[ -/3 [l -/3-2'1 
20 
The solution to the price equation is again written as equation 
123>, where A. is the characteristic root of A with a smaller norm and
! 
la+p+2Yl - cp+2Yl ll+al6 1 lo~p+2Yl - IP+2Yl ll+al6 1 
Then 1 in order to stabilize Vd against both kinds of shocks E~ and n:, 
the best policy is to minimize the absolute value of A • This would be1 
achieved by setting T ➔ ± oo because the product of the two 
characteristic roots, i.e. the determinant of A1 approaches zero. 
However, 
2'1til i m g I l) = --,,---=, > (l
o:+1,1-[!:6 
2 { l - It]+ •'f I 5} > 0 
"[ o:+ /3-f:..'0 
for a reasonably small value of o, Thus the saddle point property is 
not satisfied by this feedback rule (27), Moreover, the economic 
meaning of the feedback rule is not clear. In order to stabilize the 
forward exchange rate by intervening in the spot market, T seems to be 
only meaningful when negative, But under the assumption of o:+/3-f/S > O, 
if one reduces the value of T. from zero to minus infinity 1 at one time 
!A! and Trace Awill explode. For these reasons interventions in 
response to the forward exchange rate market cannot necessarily be 
recommended even though the same therapy seems to apply to both kinds of 
shocks in this feedback scheme. 
21 
Finally, let us consider the following intervention scheme 
responding to interest rate differences 
Then A in equation 122) can be written as 
W,•T+ fJ.- ( (1·/3+-•. ,} f•'fJ.+ 2 ·T" }' (.J~'.[-•1 '.... l(3t.i1-1 ( 2o:•,<-~) f..; l 
A = 
o:+[3+8 [ l-/3-2"/ o:+ /J+i. "l+B 
The solution to the price equation is again written as; 
).._ 
& ( f!,+ ·v l -6 !o:+Bi = = = l¢1 . ·1 JI ef,2 Al 9>3H B + H B + J ' 
where Hand J are defined as before. 
2 2 2
(i i (U1 disturbances) C.\.=__d > 0. 1.-r = r: = 0
17d - f.d 
Minimization of Vd is achieved by setting f:J ...,,. ± c,,. But when l > (/J+-Y)6, 
q(i)=-0 (meaning g(l) approach zero from - + 
negative or positive side) 
1 i m 
8 -+ ± c,:) 
Thus, only the feedback rule B ➔ + oo satisfies the saddle point property 
for a small value of 6. 
~- •") 
( i i ) (IS disturbances) a L > (i a 2 .... , = (._'TL 1 = 0qd ,::.a /lO 
8 = -a is the solution which minimizes Vd. When B = -0: 1 
( 1 ) 2 vf.i , - . , 1 l 1 . /3 l -~ .-. l . u· . f ... . ?g = - -:;:;- <. o ano q1- = -- i _,+V. iL-b .> 1 b ,; ••
f:S .. 13 
Thus, this feedback rule keeps the saddle point property. 
This feedback rule based on interest rate differentials has the 
attractive property that the product of the two characteristic roots 
remains finite in any case. Again, the intervention policy that keeps 
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interest rate differentials from changing is desirable against LM 
shocks, leaning with the wind, or a little intervention when money 
demand is interest inelastic, is desirable against IS shocks specific to 
a particular country. 
IV. The Comparison with the "Eclectic" Neoclassical Model. 
In this section we will consider optimal monetary rules in the 
"eclectic" neoclassical model where output fluctuates and compare them 
with our previous results. In fact, the analysis is much easier in this 
model, and the analogy carries through with a few reservations. Let us 
start from the macroeconomic model where prices clear in any period, but 
output decisions depend on the discrepancies beetween the actual and 
expected price level, for example, due to the nature of wage contracts 
lagging behind for a period (see, e.g. Fischer (1977) and Gray (1976}). 
Then the system of symmetric two country economies can be written 
exactly as in the 7 equations (la) - (4) in the outset of Section II, 
except that the price equations (3a) and (3b) are replaced by supply 
functions (and implicitly by goods market clearing equations that 
aggregate demand equals the aggregate supply), as follows. 
(3'b)+ M ' ·t 
The economic meaning of 6 is different from 6 we used in the 
previous sections, but for the economy of notations, we will use the 
same symbol. 
Here again, we can decompose these equations into the additive 
system and the difference system. In the additive system, if the 
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feedback rule of money supply ism:= rr i:, the dynamic equation of the 
sum of prices is written 
It is easy to show (see Taylor 1977) that 130) has Ii) a unique solution 
if rr > -o: or rr < -o:-2, and, (ii) muitiple solutions i f -o:- 2 < rr < - o:. 
If 1301 has a unique solution, (301 can be solved as 
a 1 ai 31) pt= foil+&) + la+rr) lfo+6) ut 
Since 
J _ Di,·,.,:;__'. · L 2, ,c.v... ..... + l o:+rr) 6a + f.:H o:+ 1+rr) al · 1::.a 17a fl 
we obtain the feedback rule that minimizes Va as follows: 5 
2 2 Lii ) ILM disturbances} a(:a > o, CYr7a = o·f.ia = rr ·+ +(i) ! c~:> 
2 2 2(ii ) I IS disturbances) a > 0, a __ = CY = 0) j rr = -o:17a t:.:a f.ia 
(ii i ) (Price disturbances) a2 > o, a2__ = a2 = 0) j rr = -o: - lpa ca t'/a 
Not surprisingly, these feedback rules are exactly the same as those of 
Section III-A, except fbr the case of iiiil where a finite value of rr is 
prescribed. 
Ho;iever, in the case of (iii) 1 rr = -o: - l will induce multiple 
solutions. Even in the case of iii), rr = -o: is a critical value which 
might also induce multiple solutions. 6 
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In the difference system, if the feedback rule is in the form 
d 
mt= -Tst' the difference equations of pt and st are derived as follows; 
(32) 
(33) 
These difference equations have: 
(i) a unique solution if T < - i 2o:+ 1) or 7.· > -1, and, Iii) 
multiple solutions if -(2a+l) ( T ( -1, 
When the above difference equations have a unique solution, we can 
obtain Et-lP: = Etp:+l = Ets:+l = o, and therefore, 
where I' = (p+2-Y+6) io:+TI + ( l +&) (/3+2•1) 
Thus, the feedback rule which minimizes Vd is 
2 2 2l( i ) (LM disturbances) > O; a = a ·c ± C•:lIO'Ed = 0) ' ➔r7d f.td 
2 2 2(i i ) IS disturbances) (a > o, a Ed = a = (l) ! ''[ = -o:17d pd 
2 2 2(i i i ) (Price disturbances) (ad > o, 0 = a = Oi, 'T. = -(a+li
fl i:::d i7d 
These results are also exactly the same as those of Section III - B 
e:<cept for those in case (iii). Since o: is usually less than 1 1 T ..+ ± c,::, 
and T = -a satisfy the uniqueness conditions. Here again, setting the 
value of Tat minus infinity does not make much economic sense. Also in 
dthe process the variance of p, explodes because r becomes zero. 
r 
7 = -(o:+l) will produce multiple solutions as in the additive system. 
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Similarly, other feedback rules such that: 
could be considered. But, since Etst+l = 0 if there exists a unique 
solution, there is no optimal value of T and the optimal values of 8 
are exactly the same as the optimal T, 
Thus we find that the nature of the optimal feedback rules is quite 
robust regardless of whether the structure of two economies are either 
Keynesian or neoclassical. Interest rate targets are desirable if LM 
curves are more unstable, the combination of global monetarism and 
little intervention is desirable if IS curves are more unstable. 
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V. Concluding Remarks 
The main findings are summarized in Table 1. By distinguishing the 
additive from the difference system as well as additive from difference 
disturbances, one can clarify the relationship between the global 
monetarist proposal and the discussion of misalignment of exchange 
rates. It is quite natural that the analogy of the discussion of Poole 
119701 applies to the additive system as a whole. More interesting is 
the fact that a similar analogy prevails in the difference system and 
the fact that the feedback to interest rate differentials can be equally 
effective as the feedback to exchange rates. 
In the appendix, we discussed the possible extension of our results 
ton-country cases. The analogy is not perfect where scales of national 
economies differ, but there is a case for decomposing the system into 
the world average variable and the divergence of a country variable from 
the world average. 
These results in our text are derived in a simplified model where 
economic structures of the two countries are symmetric and disturbances 
are time-independent white noises. Therefore we should recognize the 
gap between such theoretical exercise and the appropriate policy 
proposal to implement some desirable regimes. Among many necessary 
modifications and reservations, we may just mention relatively important 
ones. 
First, in the actual world, disturbances are not necessarily time 
independent but serially correlated. Moreover, we do not know exactly 
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which disturbances are permanent and which are transient. Economic 
agents and monetary authorities engage in guessing games as to which are 
permanent or transient. The simple policy recommendation obtained under 
the assumption of white noises may be modified. Presumably, more 
adaptive rules should be implemented when there are serial correlations 
in disturbances, and less rigid or drastic rules should be applied when 
we cannot identify the permanent or transient nature of disturbances. 
Secondly, the optimal rule will depend on the lag structure of the 
system and the information set on which private agents and monetary 
authorities take actions and formulate expectations on future variables. 
Finally, if we are to apply the feedback process to the current 
world situation, we need to modify our conclusions taking account of the 
ongoing process of international credit accumulation due to differences 
in saving behaviors among countries, which could be based on the 
possible difference in the pattern of time preferences, the 
technological development and the given historical datum of resource 
endowment. The two-country model developed in our paper does not take 
account of these long-run factors so that the stationary state of the 
model corresponds to the equilibrium where the current account will be 
equated to zero. In reality, however, equilibrium may consist of a path 
that allows some trend in the current account of the balance of 
payments. 
Appendix 
In this appendix we will consider the generalization of the 2 
country model in the previous sections into an-country setting, First 
28 
suppose the world consists of n symmetric countries that have identical 
parameters. Taking the Dornbusch model as an example, we have for j th 
country (omitting time subscript t) with subscript j, 
m. - p. = -ai. + y. + e.,
J J J J J 
p - p. = 6y. + µ.,
+1 ! j J J J 
and for k ~ j 
Es., 'L - s .k = i . - ik+l J !<'. J ' 1 
where sjk indicates the exchange rate of k'th currency measured in terms 
of j'th currency. 
n 
Define the average variable such that Xa = E X. I n. Then the 
j =l J 
average system is written as 
a .a Ea a) a y = -~(1 - P+l + P + ry, 
n 
Note that I: E s.k = 0 because s.' = -s . k. Also J . J f(j=l k¢j J ' 
a a a- p = 6y a p +l + ,M 
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Thus the analysis for the average system just goes through as for the 
two-country case. 
Define also the difference (from the average) variable for country 
j as 
Then the system for difference variables can be written 
d d .d d _._d m. - p. = -0:1 + y. + i.:::.. 
J J j J J 
d ,B, . d d d dy. = - . \ l J. EPd. . + pj) - n4i ( p - s . ) + n.J +1 'J J "J 
n 
wheres.= E s.k/n (= E sjk/n since s .. = 0 by definition) indicates 
J k,c!j J. k=l JJ 
the effective exchange rate for country j relative to all the other 
countries. Similarly, interest parity will read, 
.d 
= l . • 
J 
Thus discussion of the different system carries through just as in that 
of the 2-country model. 
Next we will turn to the case where there is a difference of scale 
among countries even though the parameters are still symmetric. We 
modify the IS curve taking account of the effect of different scales 
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y. = -/.3iiJ.-Ep+l ,J· + pJ.) - .E '1 .. Ip .-s ., -p.) + n.
J k .. Jk J Jt! K ·1
-;,:J 
where Yjk = -/wk, wk being the relative scale of country kin the world 
n 
such that E wk= 1. Then noting E w1~ (p. - s. - pl)=k ;,!j i. J J 1: Kk=l 
n 
L wklpj-sjk- pk)' the average system and the divergence system can 
k=l 
similarly be defined in terms of 
n 
r' ,,dxa = .!...• wkxk, = X - X . 
k=l 
A j j a 
For e:<ample, IS equations are 
a a a a, a 
y = - [:!Ii - Ep+l - p > + 17 
and 
d .. d d 
y = -/3\ l . + r!.
• J J 
The interest parity will also hold if we define 
n 
s E w, s = Lj - jk 
~ 
wks .k. 
' J 'k=l 
I( 
k;ij 
Then how can Proposition i be generalized to an-country case? We can 
state the following proposition for the case of identical scale. 
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Proposition 2: Suppose the world system of n symmetric countries with 
an identical scale can be decomposed into an average variable that 
depends only on an average disturbance and (n-1) difference variables 
that depend only on difference disturbances. Moreover, suppose that the 
average as well as all of these difference variables can be controlled 
by the parameters that can be independently chosen. Then the 
minimization of variances Var(Xa) and Var(X~)
J 
j = 2, II .I II , n is 






l l l 1 
n n n n 
N = l.. -1 10 
n n n n 
1 l 1 . 
- -l n n n n 
and 
vfn (i 0 (i 
I nN = (i ,/-- (i (i
n-1 N 
0 
0 0 (i 
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N and N are orthogonal and normalized orthogonal matrix. Define 
0 
" JTX = [ X 1 ' x2, ... ' An I and 





By the same reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1, this proposition 
follows.II 
Unfortunately, when there are differences in the relative scales of 
national economies, the same reasoning does not apply because 
w... ww1 w2 .;;. n 





w..,.-1 wrr ••wl w2 ,:, n 
w... w -1wl w2 ,:, n 
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is no longer an orthogonal matrix. Only when CoviX., X.) is zero forl . J 
any i t j, can a result similar to Proposition 2 be obtained. 
Thus in the real world where scales of countries differ, the 
average rule combined with the difference rule conducted by n-1 
countries falls a little short of the overall optimization of the 
system. However, this exercise shows that the division of labor 
involved in the average policy rule and the difference policy rule could 
have the advantage of simplicity and informational economy. 
Let us now come to the question of how to implement this 
decomposition rule, To implement the average rule, it is natural to 
consider a coordination body for the aggregate or average money supply. 
Some international arrangement or institution should be made to 
coordinate the control of the global money stock according to a 
principle similar to the McKinnon plan, The proposal to stabilize the 
aggregate money supply should be adopted if disturbances in IS curves 
dominate; the rules aimed at stabilizing the average interest rate 
should be adopted if disturbances in LM curves dominate. In order to 
implement the difference rule, unsterilized interventions in the spot 
exchange market in response to exchange rates or to interest 
differentials are the natural choice. By intervening, keeping domestic 
monetary policy intact, in the exchange market in such a way as to 
purchase the k'th currency with the j'th currency, the j'th country 
increases its money supply and reduces the money supply of the k'th 
country without changing the total world money supply. Thus the 
combination of the coordinated money supply reacting to aggregate 
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disturbances and the non-sterilized market intervention policies 
reacting to differentiated (or country specific) disturbances is the 
right assignment of policy instruments. Needless to say, coordination 
and interventions are called for only when the nature of disturbances, 
for example IS or LM; requires them. One can compute back from the 
values of ma and md the appropriate values of m and m. * An 
international organization or a surveillance body consisting of finance 
ministers may compute those assignments of monetary policies for 
participating countries by specifying the average interest rate and the 
divergences from it. 
Some readers will notice here the classical policy assignment 
proposal by Mundell (1971). If difference monetary disturbances 
dominate, and accordingly the optimal management of exchange rates 
should come close to fixed exchange rates, why not let a leader country 
such as the United States take care of the aggregate price level, and 
let the other country, say Europe, adjust their exchange rates? In a 
more generalized framework for n countries, this kind of proposal would 
work. A large country like the United States ••• a hegemon if we use 
the favorite word in political science ••• would be the natural choice 
for such a country. Suppose an aggregate disturbance without any 
differential disturbance strikes the system. If only a single country, 
say country 1, expands its money supply; then ma will increase all 
right. However, at the same time the divergence of money supply from 
the world average will increase by the same amount even in the absence 
of differential shock. Then other countries will have to adjust their 
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money supplies to stabilize their exchange rates or interest rates 
through intervention by purchasing the currency of country l with its 
own currency. As long as the differential rule reacting to exchange 
rates or interest rates functions well, the optimal rule will be 
achieved. 
Table l 
j_. D!~mi;1ant Cio<:.ed Economy Two-Country 
:u1 sturoances Kevnesi an {Poole '70) Dornbusch l Neoclassical 
:r=, 
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Footnotes 
1 See also Jones (1985) and Ueda (1983) for different uses of similar 
models, 
2 The structure of our model is almost identical with Buiter 11985), 
except that our model does not contain the expected current growth rate 
of the money stock as an augmentation term in the price equation and is 
formulated in discrete time. 
3 For a similar result in a flex-price model with many countries, see 
also Hamada 1985, Ch, 7. 
4 Depending on values of parameter value, multiple solutions may appear 
adjacent to the explosive region. It can be easily seen that T must 
pass at least one explosive region corresponding to T = -J/H if T 
decreases from zero to minus infinity, 
5 In a similar type of model, Aizenman and Frenkel (1985) proposed the 
objective function which minimizes the dead weight loss in the labor 
market. In the absence of supply shocks, our criterion in this 
neoclassical model would be justified by their microeconomic 
consideration. (See also Kawai (1986)). 
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6 Of course, this statement can be relaxed to some extent if the economy 
chooses a minimum variance solution when !f>.
1 
I < See Taylor 
(1977), McCallum (1983). 
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